LXXIII

THE MORMON REBELLION AND THE BILL TO RAISE VOLUNTEERS.

SPEECH

OF

HON. SAMUEL R. CURTIS, OF IOWA.

Delivered in the U. S. House of Representatives, March 10, 1858.

Mr. Speaker, I owe it to myself and to the House, before going into the advocacy of this bill, to show, as I hope to do, that there is occasion for calling out additional military force, as contemplated by the report of the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, of which I am a member. So far from desiring, however, to increase the permanent force of the country, I am ready to meet that question, whenever it comes up, with an argument in favor of pruning and radically changing some of its organic laws. I believe that there is no occasion for an increase of the regular or irregular army of the United States, unless there be, as I think there is, actual rebellion and war in the country, calling for some adequate force to meet and repel it.

In considering the bill before us, I shall, in the first place, undertake to show that the Mormon rebellion is a serious, imposing, and terrible offence against the constitutional rights and laws of the Government, demanding from the power of Congress signal and severe redress. I base my argument, and expect to sustain it, on the ground of Mormon resistance, Mormon rebellion, and Mormon war against the United States. On that basis, and on that alone, I advocate the passage of the bill now before the House.

In the second place, I shall undertake to show what kind and what amount of force is necessary for the occasion.

What is the condition of this Mormon rebellion? I think the House should, in justice to itself, in justice to the country, in justice to the moral sense of the world, present the evidence against the Mormons, for the purpose of showing that they are now in hostility against this Government, and that, therefore, there is a necessity for sending troops against them.

If gentlemen will look over the history of affairs in Utah for the past six months, they will verify this impeachment. About the 1st of August last, one of our agents, Captain Van Vliet, of the United States army, was sent to Utah for the purpose of buying stores for the detachment of our army going in that direction. What was the reply that he received from the Mormons? He was told, in substance, by Brigham Young, the acting Governor, that they should not come into the valley; that no officer should take his position; that his power was supreme, and that he put this Government at defiance. Captain Van Vliet, in the most courteous and kind terms, told him that it was not the design of the army of the United States to make war against Utah or his people; but that they came, on the contrary, to establish law and the constitutional rights of the Government. On that ground he placed the advance of the army towards Utah. But he was replied to in terms not to be misunderstood.

Although these communications are lengthy, as they show the commencement of this imbroglio, I deem it important that they should appear in full. I will first submit the *Report of Captain Van Vliet*, of his interview with the Mormons, about the 1st of August:

HAM'S FORK, *September* 16, 1857.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commanding General, the result of my trip to the Territory of Utah.

In obedience to special instructions, dated Headquarters Army for Utah, Fort Leavenworth, July 28, 1857, I left Fort Leavenworth July 30, and reached Fort Kearney in nine travelling days, Fort Laramie in ten, and Great Salt Lake City in thirty-three and a half. At Fort Kearney I was detained one day by the changes I had to make, and by sickness, and at Fort Laramie three days, as all the animals were forty miles from the post, and when brought in all had to be shod before they could take the road.

I travelled as rapidly as it is possible to do with six mule wagons; several of my teams broke down, and at least half of my animals are unserviceable, and will remain so until they recruit. During my progress towards Utah I met many people from that Territory, and also several mountain men, at Green river, and all informed me that I would not be allowed to enter Utah, and if I did I would run a great risk of losing my life; I treated all this, however, as idle talk, but it induced me to leave my wagons and escort at Ham's Fork, one hundred and forty-three miles this side of the city, and proceed alone.

I reached Great Salt Lake City without molestation, and immediately upon my arrival I informed Governor Brigham Young that I desired an interview, which he appointed for the next day. On the evening of the day of my arrival, Governor Young, with many of the leading men of the city, called upon me at my quarters. The Governor received me most cordially, and treated me during my stay, which continued some six days, with the greatest hospitality and kindness. In this interview the Governor made known to me his views with regard to the approach of the United States troops, in plain and unmistakable language.

He stated that the Mormons had been persecuted, murdered, and robbed, in Missouri and Illinois, both by the mob and State authorities, and that now the United States were about to pursue the same course; and that, therefore, he and the people of Utah had determined to resist all persecution at the commencement, and that the *troops now on the march for Utah should not enter the Great Salt Lake valley*; as he uttered these words, all there present concurred most heartily in what he said.

The next day, as agreed upon, I called upon the Governor, and delivered in person the letters with which I had been intrusted.

In that interview, and in several subsequent ones, the same determination to resist to the death the entrance of the troops into the valley was expressed by Governor Young and those about him. The Governor informed me that there was abundance of everything I required for the troops, such as lumber, forage, &c., but that none would be sold to us.

In the course of my conversations with the Governor and the influential men in the Territory, I told them plainly and frankly what I conceived would be the result of their present course; I told them that they might prevent the small military force now approaching Utah from getting through the narrow defiles and rugged passes of the mountains this year, but that next season the United States Government would send troops sufficient to overcome all opposition. The answer to this was invariably the same. "We are aware that such will be the case; but when these troops arrive, they will find Utah a desert; every house will be burned to the ground, every tree cut down, and every field laid waste. We have three years' provisions on hand, which we will 'cache,' and then take to the mountains and bid defiance to all the powers of the Government."

I attended their services on Sunday, and, in the course of a sermon delivered by Elder Taylor, he referred to the approach of the troops, and declared they should not enter the Territory. He then referred to the probability of an overwhelming force being sent against them, and desired all present who would apply the torch to their own buildings, cut down their trees, and lay waste their fields, to hold up their hands; every hand, in an audience numbering over four thousand persons, was raised at the same moment. During my stay in the city I visited several families, and all with whom I was thrown looked upon the present movement of the troops towards their Territory as the commencement of another religious persecution, and expressed a fixed determination to sustain Governor Young in any measures he might adopt.

From all these facts I am forced to the conclusion that Governor Young and the people of Utah will prevent, if possible, the army for Utah from entering their Territory this season. This, in my opinion, will not be a difficult task, owing to the lateness of the season, the smallness of our force, and the defences that nature has thrown around the valley of the Great Salt Lake.

There is but one road running into the valley on the side which our troops are approaching, and for over fifty miles it passes through narrow canons and over rugged mountains, which a small force could hold against great odds. I am inclined, however, to believe that the Mormons will not resort to actual hostilities until the last moment. Their plan of operation will be, burn the grass, cut up the roads, and stampede the animals, so as to delay the troops until snow commences to fall, which will render the road impassable. Snow falls early in this region; in fact, last night it commenced falling at Fort Bridger, and this morning the surrounding mountains are clothed in white. Were it one month earlier in the season, I believe the troops could force their way in, and they may be able to do so even now; but the attempt will be fraught with considerable danger, arising from the filling up of the canons and passes with snow.

I do not wish to be considered that I am advocating either the one course or the other; I simply wish to lay the facts before the General, leaving it to his better judgment to decide upon the proper movements.

Notwithstanding my inability to make the purchases I was ordered to, and all that Governor Young said in regard to opposing the entrance of the troops into the valley, I examined the country in the vicinity of the city, with the view of selecting a proper military site. I visited the military reserve, Rush Valley; but found it, in my opinion, entirely unsuited for a military station. It contained but little grass, and is very much exposed to the cold winds of winter;

its only advantage being the close proximity to fire-wood. It is too far from the city, being between forty and forty-five miles; and will require teams four days to go there and return. I examined another point on the road to Rush Valley, and only about thirty miles from the city, which I consider a much more eligible position. It is in Tuella Valley, three miles to the north of Tuella city, and possesses wood, water, and grass; but it is occupied by Mormons, who have some sixty acres under cultivation, with houses and barns on their land. These persons would have to be dispossessed or bought out. In fact there is no place within forty, fifty, or sixty miles of the city, suitable for a military position, that is not occupied by the inhabitants, and under cultivation. Finding that I could neither make the purchases ordered to, nor shake the determination of the people to resist the authority of the United States, I left the city and returned to my camp on Ham's Fork. On my return, I examined the vicinity of Fort Bridger, and found it a very suitable position for wintering the troops and grazing the animals, should it be necessary to stop at that point. The Mormons occupy the fort at present, and also have a settlement about ten miles further up Black's fork, called Fort Supply. These two places contain buildings sufficient to cover nearly half the troops now *en route* for Utah; but I was informed that they would all be laid in ashes as the army advanced.

I have thus stated fully the result of my visit to Utah; and trusting that my conduct will meet the approval of the Commanding General, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

STEWART VAN VLIET,
Captain, Assistant Quartermaster.

The proclamation of Brigham Young soon followed the departure of Capt. Van Vleit. It was conveyed to Col. Alexander, then commanding the military expedition, by Lieut. General Wells, who signhimself "Commander-in-chief of the Nauvoo Legion," a title clearly intended to show his *military* rank and position, to a *military man*, commanding our force. Col. Alexander very properly, as I will show hereafter, recognised him as a martial foe. The sending this by such a messenger bears with it an argument of military purpose, which is strengthened by the paper he conveyed.

The Proclamation of Brigham Young.

CITIZENS OF UTAH: We are invaded by a hostile force, who are evidently assailing us to accomplish our overthrow and destruction. For the last twenty-five years, we have trusted officials of the Government, from constables and justices, to judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in derision, insulted, and betrayed. Our houses have been plundered and then burned, our fields laid waste, our principal men butchered, while under the pledged faith of the Government for their safety, and our families driven from their homes to find that shelter in the barren wilderness, and that protection among hostile savages, which were denied them in the boasted abodes of Christianity and civilization.

The Constitution of our common country guaranties unto us all that we do now or ever have claimed. If the constitutional rights which pertain unto us as American citizens were extended to Utah, according to the spirit and meaning thereof, and fairly and impartially administered, it is all that we could ask, all that we have ever asked.

Our opponents have availed themselves of prejudices existing against us, because of our religious faith, to send out a formidable host to accomplish our destruction. We have had no privilege nor opportunity of defending ourselves from the false, foul, and unjust, aspersions against us, before the nation. The Government has not condescended to cause an investigating committee, or other person, to be sent to inquire into and ascertain the truth, as is customary in such cases. We know those aspersions to be false, but that avails us nothing. We are condemned unheard, and forced to an issue with an armed mercenary mob, which has been sent against us at the instigation of anonymous letter-writers, ashamed to father the base, slanderous, falsehoods which they have given to the public; of corrupt officials, who have brought false accusations against us, to screen themselves in their own infamy; and of hireling priests and howling editors, who prostitute the truth for filthy lucre's sake.

The issue which has thus been forced upon us compels us to resort to the great first law of self-preservation, and stand in our own defence, a right guarantied to us by the genius of the institutions of our country, and upon which the Government is based. Our duty to ourselves, to our families, requires us not to tamely submit to be driven and slain, without an attempt to preserve ourselves. Our duty to our country, our holy religion, our God, to freedom and liberty, requires that we should not quietly stand still and see those fetters forging around us which are calculated to enslave and bring us in subjection to an unlawful military despotism, such as can only emanate, in a country of constitutional law, from usurpation, tyranny, and oppression.

Therefore, I, Brigham Young, Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory of Utah, in the name of the people of the United States in the Territory of Utah, forbid—

First. All armed forces of every description from coming into this Territory, under any pretence whatever.

Second. That all the forces in said Territory hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice to repel any and all such invasion.

Third. Martial law is hereby declared to exist in this Territory from and after the publication of this proclamation; and no person shall be allowed to pass or repass into or through or from this Territory, without a permit from the proper officer.

Given under my hand and seal, at Great Salt Lake City, Territory of Utah, this 15th day of September, A. D. 1857, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-second. BRIGHAM YOUNG.

Both these documents go to show the determined spirit of the Mormon leader; that he was resolved to resist this Government in every form. That proclamation is, to all intents and purposes, a declaration of war. A war, not against the Indian hordes, but against this Government, the Government under which he has for years held office and received pay, and the Government which maintains and supports his national existence. But I will not stop here. I do not stand upon the mere declaration of Brigham Young. Go on to the 5th of October, and what do you see? The actual commencement of hostilities by the Mormon army against the army of the United States. Colonel Alexander, then at the head of our forces, after speaking of the communications from Lieutenant General Wells and Brigham Young, says:

"Upon receiving these letters, I prepared for defence, and to guard the supplies near us until the nearest troops came up. I replied to Gov. Young's letter, a copy of which I enclose, and have not had any further correspondence with him. On the morning of the 5th of October, the Mormons burned two trains of Government stores on Green river, and one on the Big Sandy, and a few wagons belonging to Mr. Perry, sutler of the tenth infantry, which were a few miles behind the latter train. Col. Waite, of the fifth, though not anticipating any act of this kind, was preparing to send back a detachment to these trains from his camp, on Black's Fork, when he received, from some teamsters who came in, the intelligence of their being burned. No doubt now existed that the most determined hostility might be expected on the part of the Mormons; and it became necessary, from the extreme lateness of the season, to adopt some immediate course for wintering the troops and preserving the supply trains."

This attack on the *property* of our army was just as much an act of war as though it had been on the *personnel* of your force. It was carrying out Young's proclamation declaring "martial law," and forbidding our "armed forces" from coming into his Territory. This act has never been, to my knowledge, disavowed by the acting Governor; and thus you see property of the United States to the amount of seventy or one hundred thousand dollars destroyed by the Utah forces. If that be not an act of war, what is? In every view of the subject, it is as much an act of war as though the Mormons had charged upon our army, or committed any amount of absolute hostilities.

As further evidence of the *animus* of the Mormons, in chronological array, I will read to the House a report of the proceedings of Brigham Young, in October last, in his own church. It is from a paper published by a Mormon in my own district, a member of the Church of the Latter-Day Saints. It is therefore good authority, because the editor says he extracts it from the Deseret *News*, which, as is well known, is the organ of Brigham Young. I read from the *Crescent City Oracle* of January 8th:

"We have seen files of the Deseret *News* up to the latter part of October, which indicate plainly enough the determination of resistance to the military, if an attempt is made to enter their settlements.

"From the discourses of Brigham Young we make the following extracts:

"'This people are free; they are not in bondage to any Government on God's footstool. We have transgressed no law, and we have no occasion to do so, neither do we intend to; but as for any nation's coming to destroy this people, God Almighty be my helper, they cannot come here. [The congregation responded by a loud amen.] That is my feeling upon that point.'"

Here is the argument of Brigham Young:

"If you do your duty, you need not be afraid of mobs, nor of forces sent out in violation of the very genius of our free institutions, holding you till mobs kill you. Mobs? Yes; for where is there the least particle of authority, either in our Constitution or laws, for sending troops here, or even for appointing civil officers contrary to the voluntary consent of the governed? We came here without any help from our enemies, and we intend staying here as long as we please."

I read further from his sermon:

"Suppose that our enemies send fifty thousand troops here, they will have to transport all that will be requisite to sustain them over one winter, for I promise them, before they come, that there shall not be one particle of forage nor one mouthful of food for them, should they come. They will have to bring all their provisions and forage, and though they start their teams with as heavy loads as they can draw, not one can bring enough to sustain itself, to say nothing of the men. If there were no more men here than there are in the Seminole nation, our enemies never could use us up, but they could use up themselves, which they will do. The Seminoles, a little tribe of a few hundred, in Florida, have cost our Government nearly one hundred million dollars, and they are no nearer being conquered than when the war was commenced."

This is open defiance. You perceive that, according to this unequivocal assumption, our army should not come to Salt Lake valley; and that this Government had no right to appoint officers for that Territory. Owing to their remote location, occupying a strong military position

in the mountain passes, relying upon the strength of his isolation and our unfortunate delay in subduing the Seminoles, he boldly defies us. Knowing our aversion to prosecute with vigor a war against savages, knowing the natural aversion of our people to send large forces against a weak foe, and knowing the natural advantages which he has in a wild mountainous country, he exults in a protracted war like that existing against a few Seminole Indians.

This you recollect was in the month of October. In November following, Governor Cumming, who had been appointed to succeed Governor Young, issued his proclamation, warning his predecessor that he was no longer Governor. How does Brigham Young act upon the reception of this information? Does he yield to the new appointment, made in pursuance of the organic act of the Territory? No, sir; although he himself was appointed under the same organic act, he refused to recognise the appointment of Governor Cumming, and calls together the Legislature of Utah, which, at last advices, December 21, was still in session. In pursuance of his former position, declining to recognise a successor, he has issued a long proclamation, ably written, argumentative, reiterating his former position, and avowing his intention to resist to the death any attempt of the army of the United States to enter that Terriotry, and adhering to the position that the Government of the United States has no power to appoint officers for that Territory. I present the following closing extract from his message:

"Fully aware, as has been justly written, that 'patriotism does not consist in aiding Government in every base or stupid act it may perform, but rather in paralyzing its power when it violates vested rights, affronts insulted justice, and assumes undelegated authority,' and knowing that the so-called army, reported to be on its way to Utah, was an undisguised mob, if not sent by the President of the United States, and if sent by him, in the manner and for the purpose alleged in all the information permitted to reach us, was no less a mob, though in the latter event acting under the color of law; upon learning its near approach, I issued, as in constitutional duty bound, a proclamation expressly forbidding all bodies of armed men, under whatsoever name or by whomsoever sent, to come within the bounds of this Territory. That so-called army, or, more strictly speaking, mob, refused to obey that proclamation, copies of which were officially furnished them, and prosecuted their march to the neighborhood of Forts Bridger and Supply, (which were vacated and burnt upon their approach,) where it is said they intend to winter. Under these circumstances, I respectfully suggest that you take such measures as your enlightened judgment may dictate, to insure public tranquillity, and protect, preserve, and perpetuate inviolate those inalienable constitutional rights which have descended to us a rich legacy from our forefathers.

"A civilized nation is one that never infringes upon the rights of its citizens, but strives to protect and make happy all within its sphere, which our Government, above all others, is obligated to accomplish, though its present course is as far from that wise and just path as the earth is from the sun. And, under the aggravated abuses that have been heaped upon us in the past, you and the whole people are my witnesses, that it has more particularly fallen to my lot, and been my policy and practice, to restrain rather than urge resistance to usurpation and tyranny on the part of the enemies to the Constitution and constitutional laws, (who are also our enemies, and the enemies of all Republics and republicans,) until forbearance, under such cruel and illegal treatment, cannot well be longer exercised. No one has denied, nor wishes to deny, the right of the Government to send its troops when, where, and as it pleases, so it is but done clearly within the authorities and limitations of the Constitution, and for the safety and welfare of the people; but when it sends them clearly without the pale of those authorities and limitations, unconstitutionally to oppress the people, as is the case in the so-called army sent to Utah, it commits a treason against itself which commands the resistance of all good men, or Freedom will depart our nation.

"In compliance with a long-established system in appointing officers not of the people's electing, which the Supreme Court of the United States would at once, in justice, decide to be unconstitutional, we have petitioned and petitioned that good men be appointed, until that hope is exhausted; and we have long enough borne the insults and outrages of lawless officials, until we are compelled, in self-defence, to assert and maintain that great constitutional right of the governed to officers of their own election, and local laws of their own enactment. That the President and the counsellors, aiders and abettors of the present treasonable crusade against the peace and rights of a Territory of the United States, may reconsider their course and retrace their steps, is earnestly to be desired; but in either event, our trust and confidence are in that Being, who at his pleasure rules among the armies of heaven, and controls the wrath of the children of men, and most cheerfully should we be able to abide the issue.

"Permit me to tender you my entire confidence that your deliberations will be distinguished by that wisdom, unanimity, and love of justice, that have ever marked the counsels of our Legislative Assemblies, and the assurance of my hearty co-operation in every measure you adopt for promoting the true interests of a Territory beloved by us for its very isolation and forbidding aspect; for here, if anywhere upon this footstool of our God, have we the privilege and prospect of being able to secure and enjoy those inestimable rights of civil and religious liberty, which

the beneficent Creator of all mankind has, in His mercy, made indefeasible, and perpetuate them upon a broader and firmer basis, for the benefit of ourselves, of our children and our children's children, until peace shall be restored to our distracted country. BRIGHAM YOUNG."

The Legislature called together by him, endorsed the message of Brigham Young, and pledged themselves to aid in carrying out his desperate views of resistance to the anthorities and laws of the United States. These resolutions should also go before the world, and I therefore present them to the House:

Resolutions, expressive of the sense of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, relative to the message and official course of his Excellency Governor Brigham Young.

Resolved, That we unanimously and most cordially, for ourselves, and in behalf of the well-known feelings of our constituents, concur in the sentiments and doctrines advanced in the message delivered by his Excellency Governor Young, to the Legislative Assembly of this Territory, convened in the Representatives' Hall, in Great Salt Lake City, December 15, 1857.

Resolved, That the entire policy and all the acts of his Excellency Governor Young have been able, just, and humane—conducive to and protective of the development of the best interests and welfare both of this Territory and of the General Government, so far as that policy and those acts could accomplish so desirable a result.

Resolved, That we hold ourselves, our means, and influence, in readiness to sustain his Excellency Governor Young in every act he may perform or dictate, in accordance with the Constitution and constitutional laws of the United States and the laws of Utah, for the protection of the lives, peace, and prosperity, of the people of this Territory.

Resolved, That neither the present nor any other Administration of the General Government shall enforce profane, drunken, and otherwise corrupt officials upon us at the point of the bayonet; and that the attempts so to do by the present incumbent of the Executive chair of our nation has incurred that contempt and determined opposition of all good men which such an act of usurped authority and oppression so richly deserves.

Resolved, That while we deprecate the bitter hostility manifested toward a most loyal and innocent people by the present Administration of the General Government, we will continue to resist any attempt on the part of the Administration to bring us into a state of vassalage, by appointing, contrary to the Constitution, officers whom the people have neither vote nor voice in electing; nor shall any persons appointed to office for Utah by the present Administration either qualify for, or assume and discharge, within the limits of this Territory, the functions of the offices to which they have been appointed, so long as our Territory is menaced by an invading army, (for such an army cannot have been sent to protect either the citizens or the passing emigration, but is manifestly sent to aid in trampling upon American liberty,) nor so long as such appointees are so pusillanimous as to require a numerous armed force to attend their heck, to enable them to carry out the traitorous designs concocted for depriving American citizens of their indefeasible and vested rights.

Resolved, That we will at least have our constitutional rights to a voice in the selection of our Territorial officers, and in the enactment of local laws for our government.

Resolved, That these resolutions be signed by the members of the two Houses, and be printed in the Deseret *News*.

Unanimously adopted and signed, *December* 21, 1857.

Councillors. — Heber C. Kimball, President; Daniel H. Wells, Albert Carrington, F. D. Richards, Wilford Woodruff, Joseph Holbrook, Lorenzo Snow, Lorin Farr, Benjamin F. Johnson, Leonard E. Harrington, Warren S. Snow, Lewis Brunson, George A. Smith.

Representatives.—John Taylor, Speaker; W. W. Phelps, A. P. Rockwood, J. C. Little, Daniel Spencer, Alexander McRae, Orson Hyde, J. W. Cummings, Hosea Stout, Joseph A. Young, H. B. Clawson, John Rowberry, John D. Parker, Reddick N. Allred, Chauncy W. West, Jonathan C. Wright, Aaron Johnson, James C. Snow, Preston Thomas, Jacob G. Bigler, George Peacock, P. T. Farnsworth, Isaac C. Haight, John D. Lee, Isaac Bullock.

This, sir, is the position of the Mormons at this time. They are in rebellion, in resistance, in a state of war against the United States. They have declared war, and have declared that they will resist the approach of an army, or any other power of the United States; that they are free and independent. I therefore say that an exigency has arisen when the people of a Territory of this country are in a state of open war against the United States, and are therefore guilty, not of constructive, but of high treason against the Government. I do not wish to aggravate the offence of the Mormons. I place them on the ground upon which their own papers place them. But, sir, while I would not aggravate an offence, I cannot treat the matter in any other light than that of a high crime, which deserves the calm, firm, fearless attention of the American Congress. Gentlemen must not regard this as the idle boasting of ignorant imbecility—as something that will pass over in a few weeks. I tell them that I do not so regard it. On the contrary, I forewarn gentlemen that it is a painful, perplexing, disgraceful reality, which it becomes us to consider in all its present bearings, and

all its pending consequences to the peace and honor of our country.

If gentlemen suppose they are to be subdued easily, I tell them they are mistaken. The Mormons are a thousand miles from our settlements; they occupy the passes of the mountains; they now number some sixty thousand people. I have seen them from year to year on their march to Salt Lake valley; and, from my own personal observation, I know they are a powerful and formidable force to encounter. They can at any time muster from five to ten thousand men, fully armed and equipped for war. The position which they occupy in relation to the possession of the soil, their homes, adds a powerful incentive of resistance to the United States authorities. They have not purchased their land. They claim it as the squatters of the West claim. They have not purchased their homes, as you have yours; and they are willing to fight for them against a power which their leaders have taught them to believe has purposed to crush and destroy them.

I know that they have heretofore been aggravated by acts of cruelty and persecution. They have been driven from place to place; but, it is to be recollected, these persecutions have been generally superinduced by their own folly. I do not propose to speak of anything in the past, except to show the facts incident to the present attitude of affairs. I do not propose to say anything of what has been done, or what has not been done; that is not pertinent to the present question. I say nothing of the blunders that have been committed in years past. We have no occasion to go so far back. We are obliged to take the question as it is now presented to us. The Mormons have declared war against us; and, as national legislators, it becomes us calmly to inquire how far are we called upon to inflict the fearful penalties due to such crimes. Will you withdraw your army? Will you disgrace your banners which you have sent there, by lowering them before such an array of Mormon force? Will you disgrace these men who now stand before your foes—men who have fought the battles of their country in former wars—men who have won honorable distinction in the service of the country in many a well-fought battle? I implore for them the consideration of this House.

Mr. BURROUGHS. I desire to know how many men of the army are now stationed in Kansas?

Mr. CURTIS. I reply to the gentleman as far as my information goes, (and I intend to notice this subject again in another part of my argument;) I suppose there are about three thousand men in Kansas and in the vicinity—some at Fort Leavenworth and some at Jefferson Barracks, but all in striking distance of Kansas.

VOLUNTEERS.

I now proceed to the second branch of my subject, the consideration of the kind of force which ought to be employed. How have we always heretofore acted, when occasion called for a military force? We have called upon the regulars and the volunteers, and upon some occasions the militia have turned out. The Government has, at sundry times, paid for these extraordinary efforts of the militia and volunteers, although they have gone without authority of law, believing they did good service to their country, however irregular and unarmed they have rushed to real or apparent danger. But I speak not of such impulsive gatherings of force; no military calculations should be made from them. I speak of regular volunteers, like those who went to Mexico; I speak of such as are proposed in this bill. We have a large force of regulars in Kansas that can be spared, and this bill proposes to add five regiments of volunteers for the Mormon and frontier service, which, together, is none too much.

Because of the remote position of the field of operations, it will require at least two or three months to convey a supporting force where it can co-operate with Colonel Johnson. It will require sixty days after you actually start your column, on the supposition that you take the army now in Kansas, and make that region or Nebraska your place of rendezvous. If, then, you would reinforce our Utah army, act immediately; for, with your earliest efforts, and before you will have reached Col. Johnson, months will have transpired, and further regrets may be occasioned. We cannot state the exact time that will be required to raise forces not already in service; but if you expect to assist, it is manifest you cannot be too soon about it. You cannot get any force upon the frontier, ready for movement, in less than thirty days. So it may be July or August before

you can get a sufficient force in position. This leads me to prefer volunteers, as I believe that force can be got there soonest. I recommend volunteers, as I believe them the most available.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. FAULKNER] said it was the purpose of the President to call into action all the regulars now in the western part of the United States. I am glad to hear the Government is going to collect all this available force, and put it *en route* to participate in this Utah service; yet admitting and relying on this, let the Government do the best they can, that force cannot be collected and equipped so as to move forward before the 1st of May; and all the regular force the Government can rally will not, as I suppose, augment the present force to more than three thousand five hundred men. I tell this House, we have got to go into Utah against an opposing force of five or ten thousand, and therefore you should have an active force in *Utah* of five thousand men. It is needless to talk of rallying all the regulars, as they are so widely spread throughout our remote Territories, and so fixed at stations that they are not available for present need in a Utah campaign.

Mr. LOVEJOY. I wish to inquire of the gentleman, how many soldiers there will be, with the army now on its way, and those now in Kansas, provided they were united?

Mr. CURTIS. In reply I will tell the gentleman how I estimate the force which will be necessary to carry on a successful campaign, and the sources from which to obtain it. In the first place, you want one regiment on this side of Fort Laramie, and one west of it, to sustain the military posts along the route, and guard your stores at Fort Bridger. That makes two regiments. You want another movable regiment to guard the transportation of supplies from the frontier to Utah. That is three regiments. In addition to that, you may calculate upon a force equal to one regiment of sick and disabled men. That is four. And when you get there, you must have five regiments to act efficiently. Is that too much? Five regiments to operate in the enemy's country?

Mr. LOVEJOY. I think it is.

Mr. CURTIS. I think not. That makes nine regiments, or say nine thousand men. Now, how will you raise this requisite force? In the first place, I suppose that all the regular troops which you can from vsrious quarters collect at a rendezvous, which should be at or near Council Bluffs, may amount to three thousand five hundred men; and from all the information that I can get, I apprehend there will not be more than this number collected from Western posts. There are now in Utah, under Colonel Johnston, little more than one thousand men; but when spring arrives, desertions, discharges, and other casualties, will reduce it to about this number; making the entire regular force applicable to this service, only four thousand five hundred. We propose, by the bill reported by our committee, to give the President four regiments of volunteers, which is only eight thousand five hundred men; lacking five hundred of the number which I have estimated as necessary. After allowing all that the bill proposes, the line of operation this side of the valley must be meagrely supplied, in order to give the requisite force—five thousand men—to operate in Utah.

Mr. LOVEJOY. What does the gentleman propose to do with five thousand men in Utah valley?

Mr. CURTIS. They are wanted there to prosecute war against five or ten thousand Mormons, which are now, or will be, in arms to receive them. They are wanted to move from point to point, as exigencies may require.

Mr. LOVEJOY. Does the gentleman consider that war exists?

Mr. CURTIS. I do.

Mr. LOVEJOY. Who declared it?

Mr. CURTIS. Brigham Young, as the leader and former Governor of the Mormons, who has put his forces under the command of Lieutenaant General Wells.

Mr. LOVEJOY. Has the gentleman his manifesto?

Mr. CURTIS. I have it; and, with the consent of the House, I will incorporate a portion of it in my speech. I think it will convince that gentleman, and all others, that the opposing forces are in a state of actual war. But I desire not to be detained or forced from the line of my argument.

The point I was making is, that we need the forces provided for in this bill, not for the purpose of increasing the standing army, but for the purpose of giving to the President of the United States ample

power to prosecute this war; for I insist, with regret, that war has already commenced. Gentlemen may smile, and regard it as futile, but three years will not roll around before they will know that the Government has already acted with too much leniency towards this people, now in open and avowed resistance to all the powers of this Government.

Mr. LOVEJOY. I desire to ask the gentleman if we have declared war?

Mr. CURTIS. I do not deem it necessary for this Government to declare war. I take the facts, and from the facts, as I present them to this House, I say war actually exists. I regret that such is the fact. I wish there was any contrary showing, any intimation on the part of the Mormons that they are willing to avoid the dread conclusion. I am intimately acquainted with many of these people; for there are many of the Latter-Day Saints in the West, and there is a constant intercourse between them and their friends in Utah. When they mingle and live with our citizens, they are quiet, law-abiding, and generally worthy citizens. But when aggregated together, as they were in Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and as they now are at Salt Lake, they become bigoted, fanatical, vain-glorious; and, regarding the exterior world as "gentiles," they resist all intercourse as interference; and when crimes are committed against gentiles, the criminals are shielded by a cloak of fanaticism. This isolation is inconsistent with the nature of our social and political organization; and it always has and always will lead to strife, conflict, and ultimate disaster to the weaker party. You have got to meet these Mormons as they are—in arms against your Government.

Mr. POTTLE. I desire to ask my friend what assurance he can give that the troops, if raised, will be used against the Mormons? And further, if the chairman of the Military Committee in the Senate did not, in asking for those troops, say that they were not asked expressly for Utah, but to uphold the peace of the country?

Mr. CURTIS. I have no authority to guaranty the course which this Administration will pursue. The gentleman knows I do not affiliate with that party. I take facts before me, and the public documents, which we are bound to respect; I take the President's message; I take the report of the officers of the army, whom I have known for years, and whose characters are above suspicion, and I tell the gentleman they represent matters as I have presented them. I have it from the Commanding General himself, Lieutenant General Scott, that the order has gone forth, or will go, directing the forward movement of the regulars in Kansas for operations in Utah. The gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. FAULKNER,] who has the ear of the Administration as intimately as any other gentleman on the Military Committee, and perhaps as frequently as any other gentleman in the House, tells you that the whole force shall be moved from all the West in the Utah column. I take him at his word. If the Administration will dare to neglect the honor of his country by refusing to send out such assistance as is at his command, and such as we deem necessary and proper, let them take the responsibility. Let us do our duty, and hold other branches of the Government accountable for their shortcomings or errors.

Mr. BURROUGHS. I wish to know if the gentleman believes that this Administration will respect its pledges about anything?

Mr. CURTIS. I will not go so far as to impute to the President of the United States a want of integrity in a matter so delicate as that which pertains to his duty as Commander-in-chief of our armies. I infer, from the inquiry made by my friend from New York, [Mr. POTTLE,] that he apprehends this temporary military increase is not asked for upon the ground which I have stated; that is, for an expedition to Utah. I will read from the President's message to show that he does put it emphatically on the ground of the necessity of sending a force against Utah. Let us deal fairly. This is a matter too grave and important to be made a political question of. It is a question in which the whole Republic is interested; and, if we differ about it, let us at least meet it honestly and honorably. What does the President say, in speeking of this Utah matter? He says, speaking of the conduct of Brigham Young towards Captain Van Vleit:

"A great part of all this may be idle boasting; but yet, no wise Government will lightly estimate the efforts which may be inspired by such freozied fanaticism as exists among the Mormons in Utah. This is the first rebellion which has existed in our Territories; and humanity itself requires that we should put it down in such a manner that it shall be the last. To trifle with

it would be to encoueage it and to render it formidable. We ought to go there with such an imposing force as to convince these deluded people that resistance would be vain, and thus spare the effusion of blood. We can in this manner best convince them that we are their friends, not their enemies. In order to accomplish this object, it will be necessary, accordiug to the estimate of the War Department, to raise four additional regiments; and this I earnestly recommend to Congress. At the present moment of depression in the revenues of the country, I am sorry to be obliged to recommend such a measure; but I feel confident of the support of Congress, cost what it may, in suppressing the insurrection, and in restoriog and maintaining the sovereigoty of the Constitution aod laws over the Territory of Utah."

No matter how others have spoken, we must take notice of the matter as stated by the President. If he placed it on the ground of a standing increase of the army, I would oppose him. I wish gentlemen to notice that the President puts it upon the ground of a Utah expedition; and if he fails for want of adequate force, in case we withhold it, he will bring his request as an argument for his justification and our reproach. He does not define the kind of troops. He does not say that he wants regulars. He says he wants four regiments, and I am told this four was a clerical error; that he designed to commend the views of the Secretary of War, who speaks of five. I say this in reply to the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. FAULKNER,] who spoke yesterday as though the President had called for regulars, and we are offering him volunteers. Neither does the Secratary of War call for regulars. He says that he wants five regiments, and then he says that experience has proved that regulars are more economical than volunteers. That is all the Secretary of War says. The Commander-in-chief, General Scott, says nothing as to the kind of troops. He leaves that to the discretion of Congress. I am willing to admit that the Commander-in-chief, like all army officers, always looks for an increase of the regular army when more force is called for. He has spent his life with regulars; and our army is affectionately attached to him, as he is to the army—it is natural. He has not studied the advantages of volunteers, as some of us who have served with them; and, following natural attachments and impulses, he would prefer regulars. The wisest and best of men are subject to the common infirmities of our species, and are influenced by similar motives as other men. Our army officers all entertain a just pride for their profession. Their promotion, their rank, their dominion, all seem to advance with the increase of the regular army. I wish it was otherwise. I hope the day will come when their rank and promotion, and professional prosperity, will depend more on affiliation with the volunteer forces of our country. Such an affinity would advance the interests of the volunteers, greatly increase the military power of our country, and check a current of prejudice which seems to increase against our regular army.

The calling for additional military force does not necessarily involve the character of either kind, because it is, after all, only recruits or fresh men that we enrol in the service; and whether we call them regulars or volunteers, they all come under the same "rules and regulations." If the comparison of veteran regulars be made with fresh levies of volunteers, I would award the preference where it evidently belongs, to the former; but, if you compare fresh volunteers with fresh recruits, I also award the preference where it belongs, to the volunteers; because I know they generally embody a better class of our citizens, who are more easily learned their duty.

But, sir, I have not raised this comparison of our different kinds of force, and, as far as possible, I wish to do justice to the volunteers without prejudice to the regular army. I have attempted to show that you must have at least nine regiments to make a successful campaign in Utah, and that four additional regiments are necessary, in order to secure that amount; and time being material, volunteers are most appropriate. I say that volunteers will be most easily and speedily raised. What has been the success of our efforts to increase the army within the last few years? It will be recollected that, a year or two ago, Congress passed a law increasing the pay of the officers and soldiers. It was supposed that, after that, recruiting would go on with greater activity. And yet we see that the army is not full. The returns of the Adjutant General for the last year show that the increase of the army has hardly been equal to the decrease caused by deaths, discharges, and desertion. It seems also that the force has been much below the maximum.

I read from the report of the Adjutant General, of November 27, 1857:

"The authorized strength of the army, as now posted, is 17,984. The actual strength on the 1st of July last was 15,764. The number of enlistments made during the year ending June 30, 1857, was 5,509. The number of persons offering to enlist, but who were refused on account of minority and unfitness for service, was 12,275. The number of casualties in the army, by deaths, discharges, and desertions, during the year ending June 30, 1857, was 5,729, of which 2,954 were from the last-named cause."

This report not only shows the difficulty of enlistments, but it is remarkable that so many were minors, or otherwise so degraded as to be unfit for soldiers.

Mr. POTTLE. I ask the gentleman if he can inform the House where the greatest number of desertions have taken place?

Mr. CURTIS. I cannot say as to that.

Mr. POTTLE. I ask the gentleman if the greatest number of desertions did not take place in Kansas, and were not owing to the peculiar description of service that the troops were ordered upon in that Territory?

Mr. CURTIS. I do not know whether that is so or not. I am now avoiding the Kansas question. I do not believe that the President has any right to use the army of the United States either for a police, or for a *posse*, or to defend the ballot-boxes of the country. The army of this country is intended for a different purpose. In our Republic, the ballot-box was substituted for the cartridge-box; and when these negative electrics come together in the same crucible, you will see spontaneous combustion—strife and tumult and civil war are the inevitable consequences. I deplore the act of the President in keeping two or three thousand men in Kansas; and will at any time go for prohibiting the use of our army or navy for all such purposes. But let us not mix that Kansas subject with the one now before us. We are told that the troops shall be sent to Utah. Let us look the matter in the face, and see whether it is our duty as men and legislators to put under the control of the Executive a sufficient force to execute the law.

Mr. MARSHALL, of Kentucky. The gentleman says he has been told that these troops shall be sent to Utah. I would like to know from the gentleman if he can state the date of that determination?

Mr. CURTIS. I would say to my friend from Kentucky, that I understood so three weeks ago, in a private conversation with General Scott himself. It was a private conversation on public business, and therefore I suppose it is no breach of trust to speak about it. I understood it to be the policy of the Administration, and the General's purpose, to send the Kansas troops on to Utah, as soon as the season would permit. I have heard the same purpose declared by my friend from Virginia, [Mr. FAULKNER] whom I suppose to be in communication with the Administration; and I am not disposed to doubt the fact, since it comes so distinctly stated by high authority. If the Administration does not send all the force it can get to Utah, I tell you that the campaign will be a perilous one. The honor of the country will not be sustained, and, in my opinion, the President himself will have reason to deplore such a diversion of these forces. Put the force into the hands of the President, and if he does not send it to Utah, if he does not stand by your eagles, if he does not sustain your laws, hold him accountable for it. Hold up his conduct before the people, and before those who declare now the purpose of the President of the United States to perform his duty by sending the Kansas troops to Utah.

Mr. Speaker, I do not want it to appear that I am defending the Administration. I have no right or inclination to speak of the Administration from any personal knowledge. Other gentlemen, I trust, are better able to defend him than I am. So far as the past course of the Administration is concerned, I leave it with them.

I am very far from approving of the retention of troops last year in Kansas; but I speak of the future. I speak of what the Administration ought to do, and what we are led to believe they intend to do; and I trust that, on this subject, the President will act with patriotism, fairness, and fidelity. I repeat, this is not a party question, and I hope gentlemen will not try to make it such. I ask the Republicans of this House especially to recollect that these Mormons have, for years past, been doing violence to good morals. They have raised the standard of liberty to sustain rebellion, and the standard of religion to support licentiousness. They despise our laws, and now declare they will never submit to them. Brigham Young held power for years under the law organizing that Territory, and under that law he should have submitted to his successor.

But when he finds, after receiving his salary as Governor for years, that he is to be removed and superseded, he declares the law null and void, and asserts that the Government of the United States has no power to send officers there whom the Mormons themselves have not appointed. In other words, they say that the Government of the United States has no power to remove Brigham Young, who claims to hold his office as Governor by the grace of God, and not by the laws of Congress.

Now, the question of the kind of force to be sent there has been brought up; and I regret that I am diverted so often from my purpose to discuss that matter. Admitting that this additional force of four or five regiments is necessary for the purpose of quelling the difficulty in Utah, I say that the best force to be sent there is a volunteer force, first, because they can be soonest brought into service. How was it in the Mexican campaign? On the 13th day of May, Congress passed a law calling for volunteers from the different States of the Union. On the 20th of May, in the same year, the proclamation was made in the State of Ohio; and in just one month from that day there were three regiments organized and turned over to the United States, ready for service in Mexico, and enough to form ten or twenty more regiments had been declined and discharged. On the 18th of July these Ohio volunteers were in Mexico, where they found others from Indiana, Tennessee, Georgia, Kentucky, and other parts of the Union, who had already arrived at Brazos Santiago, ready and able to do good service in an enemy's country. Certainly, you cannot organize regulars so expeditiously.

Within sixty days from this time, there could be raised in this country three millions of volunteers, if the exigencies of the country required such a force—the best elements in the world to mould into an army. Such an army would be invincible against any force that could be brought against the country. The military power of the country consists in this vast numerical force, which is ready, on a proper occasion, to rush to your standard as volunteers. And now that you have occasion to have a force in the field, I ask you to look to those whom you can and must rely upon to protect your honor and fight your battles on all occasions of great necessity. Encourage by your acceptance a force that you see armed, equipped, and well drilled, in almost every city, town, and hamlet, of your country; a force that volunteers and expects to share in the occasions of actual service; a force which in all your wars has been your main dependence, and one that has written its own glorious character in all your sieges, garrisons, marches, and battles.

Mr. BURROUGHS. I ask permission of the gentleman to read some paragraphs from the speech of Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the Senate.

Mr. CURTIS. I know that Senator DAVIS puts the necessity for force upon the ground that it is necessary to increase the standing army. I do not take that ground. I am not concluded by the honorable Senator. I do not believe that to be the true ground. The force is asked for a Utah expedition. I take the ground that it is necessary to strengthen the army in Utah. If I believed what Senator DAVIS says, that it is to increase the standing army, I would myself vote against this bill. But he has no right to speak for the Administration; he has no right to speak for me; and he has no right to speak for the Committee on Military Affairs of this House.

But gentlemen have said here, and it has been said by the Adjutant General of the army of the United States, and it has been said in the speech of Senator DAVIS, which the gentleman presented, and proposes to read from, that a volunteer force is the most expensive.

The SPEAKER. It is hardly in order for the gentleman to allude to what is said in the other wing of the Capitol.

Mr. CURTIS. I am replying to an inquiry made by my friend from New York, [Mr. BURROUGHS.] I speak of a pamphlet which he presents before me, and with due respect to the Senate.

But I desire also to notice the report of the Adjutant General of the Army, which I have before me, especially so much of it as supports his argument, showing that volunteers cost vastly more than regulars. I have also before me the expression of Mr. Poinsett, when Secretary of War; and also the opinion of the present Secretary of War, together with the argument of the honorable gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. FAULKNER;] all attempting to show that volunteers are more expensive than

regulars. Upon this array of testimony against the cost of volunteers, it is argued here and elsewhere that regulars should be called out to meet the present and every other emergency. This argument has been presented and reiterated over and over again, although, as I will show, to a mathematical certainty, it is entirely fallacious. The regular army of the United States has been represented here, by its officers and defenders; but who has represented the volunteers? Who has taken the trouble to look over musty documents, to ascertain how figures have been made to show what, at first sight, appears absurd? We have presented to us long bills of expenses of the volunteers, which have been placed upon public record; and many have supposed these figures are incontrovertible. Sir, it is a fearful charge against the volunteers, that they are so much more wasteful and improvident than the regulars as to involve four or six times the expense.

Now, sir, the figures in the report of the Adjutant General, which I have before me, refer to tables erroneously prepared some twenty years ago, and still more erroneously applied to volunteers in Mexico and volunteers proposed in this bill. So far as this bill is concerned, the report of the Adjutant General has not the least force, because we provide that the infantry volunteers shall have the same allowances, in all respects, as regulars; and the mounted forces are also to have the same allowance, except, as the horses are to be furnished by the volunteers, forty cents a day is given for the use and risk of this item.

The argument of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. QUITMAN] would also seem to extinguish the averment of the Adjutant General, by raising the simple inquiry, how it was possible there should be such a difference in the Mexican war, when the pay of volunteers and regulars was the same, and all other supplies and transportations were controlled by officers of the regular army. The Adjutant General states the number of companies employed in the Mexican war as one thousand two hundred and seventy-seven; and then he refers to a table, made out twenty years ago, to show that the cost of such a company of volunteers for six months is $2,625. It is the use of this last item that has been the foundation of all the charges of greater cost; but, as I design to examine it, I submit a portion of the Adjutant General's report:

"Adding up these three numbers, we shall have eighty-three thousand; and dividing this by sixty-five, or the aggregate of a company of fifty privates, we will get one thousand two hundred and seventy-seven companies; which, multiplied by $2,625, or the difference between the cost of a regular infantry company and one of foot volunteers, for six months, according to the computation of the Paymaster General, in 1838, (see House Document 271, second session, Twenty-fifth Congress, table A,) we shall have $3,352,125 for the minimum amount expended upon these volunteers, over what the same number of regular troops would have cost during the same time. Going through the same calculations with the mounted volunteers enumerated above, observing only that the difference of cost between the mounted companies of volunteers and regular troops for six months is greater, amounting to $9,002, we shall get, in the same way, $3,744,832; which, added to the previous amount, leaves $7,096,957 as the clear amount which must have been saved during the Mexican war by the use of regular troops instead of volunteers; and, by making a fair allowance for the unnecessarily large mounted force of volunteers called out, this amount will even go up to $9,021,733. And should we further consider the comparative loss and destruction of military stores and public property by the two forces referred to in the report of the Paymaster General, we may safely assume that not much short of twenty millions might have been saved in the course of the Mexican war, by the employment of regular troops in lieu of volunteers; and this is, undoubtedly, an under-estimate."

In the reports of the Twenty-fifth Congress, volume eighth, report of the Paymaster General, pages 9 and 10, I find the tables from which this magic number, $2,625, is obtained. It is there, in the report of General Towson, it is attempted to show that a six-months company of volunteers costs the Government $2,625 more than a six-months company of regulars. It was all wrong, as applied to volunteers then, because the charges against the volunteers include a charge for transportation; while no charge is made for transportating regulars, as though regulars were there without any transportation! But the matter I particularly object to, is the use of this item against the Mexican volunteers, and predicating on it a charge of improvidence and extravagance; alleging their cost at four times as much as that of the regulars. How does that table apply?

The table on page 10, to which I allude, foots up the cost of a volunteer company, for six months, at - $7,287.69

The table on page 9, relating to regulars, foots up at - 4,662.02

Taking the difference, you have this fatal number - $2,625

Let us first examine the table which relates to volunteers, and see how it applies to Mexican volunteers. I find three classes of charges which should be erased, if you use the table for the Ohio and other ordinary Mexican volunteers. They are: 1st. Charges for transportation. It is obvious that transportation of volunteers costs no more, or not so much, in the Mexican war, since the volunteers were generally gathered nearer the scene of service, than the regulars. 2d. An ensign is charged in the table; and since the law organizing the Mexican volunteers, (see vol. 9, page 10, Statutes at Large,) prescribing the officers, does not include an ensign—and, as my recollection serves me, none were used—that item should be excluded. 3d. Clothing. The same statute (page 18) prescribes the amount volunteers were to receive- $3.50 per month for clothing, which would be twenty-one dollars for six months. Whereas the table used by the Adjutant General charges more and various prices, as shown below. In conformity to these erroneous items, the table should be corrected as follows:

Deduct for Transportation.

Captain	$106.20
First lieutentant	82.20
Second lieutenant	76.20
First sergeant	22 39
3 sergeants	56.46
4 corporals	56.16
2 musicians	23.32
1 private	11.66
49 privates	571.34
	1,005.93
Ensign	459.20

Clothing Errors.

First sergeant	Charged	$36.91
" "	Received	21.00
		$15 91
3 sergeants	$36 91 — 21 x 3=	47.73
4 corporals	36.23 — 21 x 4=	56.92
2 musicians	36 75 — 21 x 2=	31.50
50 privates	35.23 — 21 x=$14.21 x 50=	711.50
		863.56
		2,328 69

This shows that $2,328.69 should be deducted from the cost of volunteers; which, being so deducted, leaves only $4,959, instead of $7,287.69, as the cost of a company of fifty volunteers for six months. This would almost annihilate the fatal number, ($2,625;) but I proceed further. The table on page 8 of the old report, to which I have referred, and which purports to give the cost of regulars, is also erroneous when applied to volunteers of 1846. The error is an under-charge for clothing regulars. To determine the clothing allowed a regular soldier, I have referred to the Army Regulations, pages 209, 210; and to estimate the cost thereof, I have had reference to the estimates furnished this Thirty-fifth Congress. (See Ex. Doc. No. 1, page 187.)

I have taken the allowance for two years, and thus tried to determine a fair average for six months:

First Year.

1 cap, complete	$1.45
1 forage cap	50
1 dress coat	6.93
1 pair epaulets	–
1 pair shoulder-straps	–
1 pair aiguillettes	–
1 wool jacket	2.00
2 pairs woollen overalls, $2.64 each	5.28
1 cotton jacket	1.00
3 pairs cotton overalls, $1.25 each	3.75
2 cotton shirts, 93 cts. each	1.86
2 flannel shirts, 93 cts. each	1.86
2 pairs drawers, 47 cts. each	94
4 pairs boots, $1.93 each	7.72
4 pairs stockings, 28 cts. each	1.12
1 leather stock	13
1 great coat	6.97
1 forage frock, (not known)	–
1 blanket	3.10
	44.61

Fourth Year.

1 woollen jacket	$2.00
2 pairs woollen overalls	5.28
1 cotton jacket	1.00
3 pairs cotton overalls	3.75
2 cotton shirts	1.86
2 flannel shirts	1.86
1 pair drawers	47
4 pairs boots	7.72
4 pairs stockings	1.12
Fourth year	25.06
First year, brought forward	44.61
Total for two years	69.67
For six months, one-fourth of the above	17.41
Add commission, insurance, and transportation	6.59
Average cost of clothing for regulars	24.00

The regular force in Mexico was allowed a major and one assistant surgeon more than volunteers were allowed. To make the table right, therefore, so as to show the comparative cost of a regular

company, which is to apply as a measure of relative cost for the two kinds of force, it is necessary to charge one-tenth of the cost of these officers to a company, as its share of that extra expense. Estimating the perquisites, pay, &c., I estimate the cost of a major of the United States at $1,000 for six months, and an assistant surgeon at $700.

Having thus determined the average cost of clothing at $24, and the amounts chargeable for a major and assistant surgeon, I present the following table of items, which should be added to the cost of regulars:

Clothing.		
3 servants	$24 each=$72	
Table B	15 each= 45	
	—	$27.00
1 sergeant	$24—$17.16=	6.84
59 sergeants, corporals, musicians, and privates, each charged $8 too low		472.00
Add one-tenth cost of additional major to regulars—see act 1846		100.00
Add one-tenth cost of additional assistant surgeons allowed regulars		70.00
Total increase		675.84
From table B		4,662.02
		5,337.86

Taking, then, these corrected items, we have—

For the cost of a company of regulars for six months	$5,337.86
For the cost of company of volunteers	4,959.00
Difference in favor of *volunteers*	378.86

I have thus not only over-balanced the multiple $2,625, which was used to the cost of volunteers, but I have in its stead a multiple $378 86, which I consider fairly chargeable to the regulars. Thus showing that regulars, not volunteers, in the Mexican war, cost the most.

In this estimate I have compared infantry with infantry, because this is the only fair way of making comparisons.

The statement of the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. FAULKNER,] that volunteers could only be procured *mounted*, is entirely erroneous. The only trouble on the occasion of the first Mexican call was, that infantry volunteers overwhelmed the rendezvous with from four to ten times the requisite numbers; and I give it as my opinion that Iowa can in thirty days furnish half the force proposed in this bill, either as infantry or mounted, as the President may elect.

What I have shown with regard to the comparative cost of volunteer infantry, could be shown as to volunteer cavalry. The tables from which the Adjutant General made his calculations were erroneous at first, because they compared regulars without transportation, with volunteers including transportation; and they are wholly irrelevant to the Mexican and proposed volunteers, because these latter, by law, have substantially the same or less allowances than the regulars.

But the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. FAULKNER] seems to think volunteers are too uncontrollable, too impetuous; and that the country should rely on the old maxim of military science, as he presents it:

"A regular soldier is an unimpassioned instrument of war. He is a machine in the hands of higher intelligence. He is the child of obedience. Obedience is the law of his existence. He is ready to march or countermarch, to go into cantonments or go into the cannon's mouth, as his superior officer may order him to do. You want a soldiery which will be under the perfect control of its officers."

Mr. Speaker, this is the *formula* of a soldier that has been transmitted to us from a despotic and barbarous age. I once heartily imbibed and entertained it; but I have long since perceived that it is not applicable to a republican civilization, to which we have advanced. In all our wars, men of intelligence rush to arms; and it is often the case that the officer commands higher intellects than his own.

At our Military Academy at West Point, cadets are appointed to offices; they are regularly promoted, and, at drills and elsewhere, command their fellow-cadets, who they hourly meet in section rooms as friends and peers. Obedience to orders, and precision of military duty and drill, is nowhere more perfect than where the cadets are under their own officers. I see those around me who will attest, as I can, to this, from personal experience Volunteers can and should be commanded on the same principle. "The more intelligent, the better the soldier," is a wiser, better, and more republican maxim than your dictum of an "unimpassioned instrument in the hands of a higher intelligence." Educated, intelligent men, readily comprehend the necessity of strict discipline, prompt obedience, and secret councils. If their officers act consistently with the rational rules of the service, they will find their men "the chil-

dren of obedience," ready to "march or countermarch," as the commander directs. Look at the volunteers in New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and in this city. Do they not march with martial tread, and some mechanical precision? In Iowa, we have companies that would do credit to any army. But look back at the courage, endurance, dangers, and extraordinary perfection in the execution of military evolutions, manifested by volunteers in Mexico. I have, to a limited extent, commanded cadets, regulars, and volunteers; and I do no injustice to the former when I say that I have never seen battalion drills which excelled those executed by the third regiment of Ohio volunteers, in the presence of Gen. Wool and other army officers, on the plains near Saltillo. And this was only one of many regimets that claimed pre-eminence in the performance of military evolutions towards the close of the Mexican war.

If you would avoid a large standing army, encourage such volunteers. Diffuse the knowledge acquired at West Point more widely among the reading militia of our country, the great American army of millions. Complete an organization that is suited to war as well as peace, regulars and volunteers, and make it capable of immediate expansion or contraction, to suit emergencies that will inevitably arise. Attach the graduates of the Academy to the volunteers as well as the regulars, and let hand-books be prepared, convenient for every arm and every elementary division of each arm of the service. Circulate these hand-books throughout the ranks of your great national reserve, to enable all classes to assist in acquiring military knowledge. Mark well the recommendation of Lieutenant General Scott, who, in his recent report, seems to foreshadow these impressions, by saying:

"But to render the service honorable, so that citizens may freely enlist without the fear of harsh, arbitrary, or capricious treatment at the hands of any superior, some additional legislation seems indispensable. I allude to a revision of the 'rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States,' and particularly the 45th, 65th, 66th, 67th, and 99th of those articles, all respecting the administration of justice, in order, among other things, to provide for the *legal* punishment of petty offences, (substituting, when necessary, courts consisting entirely of sergeants,) so as to deprive commanders of small detachments and isolated companies of all pretext (the want of officers to compose courts, &c.) for taking the law into their own hands. Accordingly, I recommend that the subject be, in the first instance, referred to a board consisting of intelligent officers of great experience with troops, and, if their report be approved, that it next be submitted to Congress. (The same board might, with great benefit, revise the General Regulations for the Army, and the conflicting systems of infantry tactics now in force.")

All this and more is necessary to complete our military system, and adapt it to this great Republic and the developments of the age. The bill before you is a step in the right way. It will evince your reliance on what I consider the available, economical, and most efficient, element to mould into an army. Thousands are offering to volunteer, who are proposing to enlist?

Mr. Speaker, the Mormon rebellion has assumed the attitude of civil war. The great central international line of travel, which connects us with the Pacific settlements, is entirely intercepted. Thus far, property only has been destroyed; but on our broad and beautiful prairies of the West, the opening flowers of spring will be crimsoned with fratricidal blood. No man in this House deplores it more than I do; but I have not overwrought the picture of opposing passions and the inevitable results of opposing military force. It is not the province of our committee to propose the commissions of warning, of entreaty, and peace, that should be offered; these should all be exhausted before we appeal, as the Mormons have, to the last resort. But with your commissions of peace, adopt ample means to support your power; and if argument, entreaty, and commissions, fail, and the Mormons continue defiant, belligerent, and unscrupulous, then "cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war." Instead of a weak column, that only provokes resistance, and invites military assault, send a powerful, overwhelming force, and carry on a vigorous campaign, if you will avoid a protracted, sanguinary struggle, that will deplete our Treasury, corrupt the public morals, and disgrace the annals of our glorious Republic. I ask, therefore, for calm and early action on the bill which we have presented for the consideration of the House.